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Home Savings & Loan Assoc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
VINCENT ROTTA, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAL HAWK, et al., 
Defendants. 
MOTION OF HOME SAVINGS AND 
LOAN FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C84-6174 
Civil No. C85-5268 
Civil No. C85-5384 
Civil No. C86-1310 
* * * * * * * 
Home Savings and Loan Association moves this Court pursuant to Rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, for judgment determining that its Trust Deedfs on the five 
parcels which are the subject of these consolidated actions are superior to each and all of 
the mechanics liens which have been filed against the subject properties. This Motion is 
not directed to the claims, if any, of Vincent Rotta, Jr., in the subject parcels. 
This motion is based upon the all the pleadings on file herein, the Affidavits filed 
herewith, and the Memorandum of Law filed in support of the Motion, all of which 
demonstrate that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that Home 
Savings and Loan is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
DATED this ? day of / W v L £ , 1986. 
^ U ' V W i l 
Keith W. Meade 
Attorney for Defendant 
Home Savings & Loan Assoc. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Notice of Hearing was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the ^y day of MynJ]
 ? 
1986, to the following: 
James E. Morton 
HATCH, ELDREDGE & MORTON 
Attorney for Vincent Rotta, Jr. 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Grant G. Orton 
ORTON & PETTY 
Attorney for Pihl and Clark 
Enterprise's, Inc., IPC Ltd., 
a Utah Limited Partnership, 
Equity Reliance Corporation 
2060 East 3300 South, Suite 102 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
David Stazinsky 
Security Title 
330 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
C. Reed Brown 
HINTZE & BROWN 
Attorney for Kirby Building 
Systems, Inc. 
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Randall L. Skeen 
Attorney for Defendant 
Geneva Rock Products 
4069 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Steven H. Gunn 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Kent Collins 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN 
50 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
(HomeSav-7) 
Noall T. Wootton 
8 Center Street 
P.O.Box 310 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Scott E. Miller 
Chief Title Officer 
Universal Title Insurance 
5776 Lincoln Drive 
Edina, Minnesota 55436 
A. H. Boyce 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Randall W. Richards 
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS 
Attorney for Pioneer Door Sales 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Parley R. Baldwin 
BROWNING, BLACKBURN & BALDWIN 
Attorney for Johnson Electric Motors. 
Bank of Utah, Suite 320 
2605 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Walter F. Bugden 
BUGDEN, COLLINS <5c KELLER 
8 East Broadway, Suite 426 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lynn J. Clark 
Attorney for RCI, Inc., a Utah corporation 
935 East 7220 South, Suite D-108 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDI 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
salt Lake County U tah " 
JUN 13 1986 
H. Dixon Hindlev, Clerkjrd Dlst Court g l A L DISTRICT m'™UTt 
Deputy Clerk 
VINCENT ROTTA, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAL HAWK, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil Nos, C-84-6174 
C-85-5268 
C-85-5384 
C-86-1310 
Before the Court are reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment 
on the question of priority of liens between Home Savings as 
mortgagee and Western General as general contractor. All parties 
agree that there are no material questions of fact, and that 
the issue of priorities should and can be decided as a matter 
of law. Also before the Court is Western General's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment against Pihl and Clark. All counsel 
appeared and argued their respective positions. The Court took 
the matter under advisement to further consider the issues raised 
by the parties, consider further the Memoranda and legal argument, 
together with supplemental authorities submitted by the parties. 
The Court has now reviewed those matters so submitted, including 
the Memoranda and Affidavits on file, and being otherwise fully 
advised, enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
Based upon the facts and circumstances before the Court 
as undisputed facts regarding the question of "commencement 
ROTTA V. HAWK PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
to do work" as that term is used in Section 38-1-5 of the Utah 
Code Ann., 1953 as amended, it does not appear to the Court, 
under the appropriate case law that governs the issue, that 
there has been a "commencement to do work" so as to place the 
lien claimants ahead of the mortgagee. Therefore, the Motion 
for Summary Judgment of Home Savings is granted, and the Motion 
for Summary Judgment of Western General is denied. 
As to Western General's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
as to Pihl and Clark, the record reflects that there are material 
questions of fact existing which would prohibit Summary Judgment 
on the issues presented in that Motion, and therefore the Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment is denied. 
Counsel for Home Savings and Pihl and Clark are to prepare 
appropriate Orders in conformance with this Memorandum Decision, 
and submit the same to the Court for review and signature in 
accordance with the Local Rules of Practice. 
Dated this / -~~* day of June, 198 6. 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C84-6174 
Civil No. C85-5268 
Civil No. C85-5384 
Civil No. C86-1310 
Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Home Savings and Loan 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
* * * * * * * 
s ' 
VINCENT ROTTA, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAL HAWK, et al., 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * 
This consolidated action came on for hearing at 3:30 p.m. on Monday, May 5, 1986 
before the Honorable Timothy Hansen on various motions for summary judgment, 
including the motion of Home Savings and Loan for summary judgment against all parties 
except Vincent Rotta. The Court, having considered the argument of counsel, the 
memoranda filed regarding the motion, the pleadings on file, and the Stipulation of the 
parties made in open court that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding 
the issue of priority, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that: 
1. There was no "commencement to do work or furnish materials" as that term 
is used in U.C.A. §38-1-5 prior to the recording of the interest of Home Savings and Loan 
on the property described in Exhibit "A", 
2. The interest of Home Savings and Loan in the property described in Exhibit 
"ATf is prior to and superior to the interest of the lien claimants1 and against said lien 
claimants, the title of Home Savings and Loan is quieted to the property described in 
Exhibit "A". 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this day of June, 1986: 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Keith W. Meade 
^Attorney for Def. Home Savings 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^James E. Morton 
Attorney for Vincent Rotta, 
3450 Highland Dr., #304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Offc 
Jr. 
oall T. Wootton 
Attorney for Western Gen. 
P. 0. Box 310 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Grant G. Orton 
^Attorney for Pihl & Clark 
2060 East 3300 South #102 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Scott E. Miller 
^/ Chief Title Officer 
Universal Title Ins. 
5776 Lincoln Drive 
Edina, Minnesota 55436 
David Stazinsky 
Security Title 
330 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
A. H. Boyce 
68 S. Main, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Kent Collins 
u
 50 S. Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Randall W. Richards 
//"Attorney for Pioneer Door 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Parley R. Baldwin 
^/'Attorney for Johnson Elect. 
Bank of Utah, Suite 320 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
ts Steven H. Gunn 
400 Deseret Bldg. 
79 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
C. Reed Brown 
^3450 Highland Drive, #301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
u/ Walter F. Bugden #8 E. Broadway, Suite 426 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lynn J. Clark 
^/Attorney for RCI, Inc. 
935 East 7220 South, #D-108 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Randall L. Skeen, Esq. 
^4069 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
^ 
This judgment has no affect upon the interest, if any/of Vincent Rotta in the 
subject property. .
 i:, 
.,' ; \ DATED this" ' j ffday of Q f r i t ^ 
a ^ * 
> 
t. •»# p i < « 
* < ' v | V } 
M r \ * 
j 1986. 
BYI^HECOUfeT 
1
 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and^6 
mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the / day ofv^  
James E. Morton 
HATCH, EL DREDGE & MORTON 
Attorney fo Vincent Rotta, Jr. 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
R. Dale Potter UL>U\JO uiowAd-ie DV. suite ti 
-&£84-Seu*ft-33Q-West, IC-274-
Salt Lake City, Utah-84W-7-su„b-
ATTE5 • _u 
!t copy of the ioRegwffig^ Was 
, 1986, to the following: 
Grant G. Orton 
ORTON & PETTY 
Attorney fpr Pihl and Clark 
Enterprises, Inc., IPC Ltd., 
a Utah Limited Partnership, 
Equity Keliance Corporation 
2060 East 3300 South, Suite 102 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
David Stanzinsky 
Security Title 
330 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Parley R. Baldwin 
BROWNING, BLACKBURN tc BALDWIN 
Attorney for Johnson Electric 
Motors 
Bank of Utah, Suite 320 
2605 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Noall T. Wootton 
8 Center Street 
P.O. Box 310 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Scott E. Miller 
Chief Title Officer 
Universal Title Insurance 
5-776 Lincoln Drive 
Edina/JMinnesota 55436 ' 
A. H. Boyce 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Randall W. Richards 
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS 
Attorney for Pioneer Door Sales 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
C. Reed Brown 
HINTZE & BROWN 
Attorney for Kirby Building 
Systems, Inc. 
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84106 
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Randall L. Skeen 
Attorney for Defendant 
Geneva Rock Products 
W-es^aHey-Otty, Utah 84m—s*-*- ur ™}0h 
Steven H. Gunn 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Walter F. Bugden 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & KELLER 
8 East Broadway, Suite 426 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lynn J. Clark 
Attorney for RCI, Inc. a Utah 
corporation 
935 East 7220 South, Suite D-108 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Kent Collins 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN 
50 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
(Home-1) 
•J y o s l l V :,..:• ,;or 
J jAtucmey v.-*- "ei^ndar:?. Ve*i.:tcz: G e n e r a l 
j| Ccr 3 t r u c t i o : i Co . | | F .O . Box 310 
American F o i k , Utah ,84003 
«* IN. THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
XS-H;,;NT ROTTA, JR. , 
I/I.ai nf.if f , . 
et.al.. 
y
 Defendants. 
RULE 54b ORDER 
Civil Nos. C8*-6174, No. 
C85-5268. No. C85-5384 
and C86-1310 
J u r ^ e Timothy Hanson 
i , 
Pursuant to notice, the >iu- r.. OL t\e plaintiff Western 
"'^ '-7^ 1:; Sc^tructiori nomp^v, for a 'ecermination by the Court 
fder of jvXy I8,IS0-6, WJS a f.ir\, order under the provisions 
: r-u')> 54iv"of t^e viTt&b Rules of Givi' rocedure, came on regularl 
k
.r r,^ -^ "1 tirfoie -*c Honorable Txm Hanson, Judge of the above 
>. "t. '.o^a^ber #: . 1.r<?>6 , • e hour of 4:00 p.m. The defendan 
'?'""' J > .•'-.,:?•.,• r •'•:»;• -. ,\ Presented by its counsel 
:- i\erde The d. fer*dan: venev-j K\cck Products appeared throt 
,.}.L'.' : L;ket ;i its attorney. i, „.-..er now having been submit 
• ti./ Co».:. •', chi :•••%?£' no'j finC that there are multiple 
:.ir5;- fct tellef ar ..ciple parties to this action. The judgmei 
1
 r7 o- he be?•.•••'•• a of rV,e Ord. : .ant ;ig the Motion for Summary 
• ••,.:••: ;J. << b/ .*•'•.  savings and Lo n Association would be an 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
K50TTON, SMITH 
* ASSOCIATES 
ITOHNEYSATLAW 
J NORTH CENTER 
ERICAN FORK, UTAH 
756-3576 
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appealable judgment and Order but for the fact that other parties 
remain in the action. 
This Court determines in its sound discretion that there is 
no just reason for delay of the appeal of Western General Construe 
Company, if they choose to do so. 
Dated this day" of November,1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE TIMOTHY HANSON 
Approved as to form: 
Attorney for Home Savings 
and Loan Association 
Attorney for Geneva Rock 
Products 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this / Vi day of November, 1986 : 
Randall L. Skeen 
Attorney for Geneva Rock Products 
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Keith W. Meade 
Attorneys for Home Saving; 
Loan 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 
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4 
5 
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8 
9 
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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
HON, SMITH 
ASSOCIATES 
RNEYSATLAW 
RTH CENTER 
AN FORK, UTAH 
756-3578 
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James E. Morton 
Attorney for Vincent Rotta, Jr 
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
A.H. Boyce 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Randall W. Richards 
Attorney for Pioneer Door Sales 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Parley R. Baldwin 
Attorney for Johnson Electric 
[Motors, Inc. 
Bank of Utah, Suite 320 
2605 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Steven H. Gunn 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
brant G. Orton 
Orton & Petty 
(Attorneys for Pihl & Clark 
IPC Ltd., Equity Reliance 
2060 East 3300 South #102 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
(Scott E. Miller 
Chief Title Officer 
[Universal Title Insurance 
5776 Lincoln Drive 
Edina, Minnesota 55436 
JDavid Stazinsky 
Security Title 
330 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
C. Reed Brown 
Attorney for Kirby Building 
3450 Highland Drive, Suite'301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Walter F. Bugden 
Bugden, Collins & Keller 
#8 East Broadway, Suite 426 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lynn J. Clark 
Attorney for RCI, Inc. 
935 East 7220 South, #D-108 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Kent Collins 
Holme, Roberts & Owen 
50 South Main Street #900 
Saltg Lake City, Utah 84144 
Mu, .Jys.QifAf c(scZ< s 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
38-1-3 Utah Code Annotated: Those Entitled To 
Liens - Who May Be Attached - Lien on Ores and Mines. 
Contractors, sub-contractors and all persons 
performing any services or furnishing any materials 
used in the construction, alteration or improvement 
of any building or structure or improvement to any 
premises in any manner; all persons who shall do work 
or furnish materials for the prospective development, 
preservation or working of any mining claim, mine, 
guarry, oil or gas well or deposit; and licensed 
architects and engineers and artisians who have furnishe 
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, 
estimates of cost, surveys or superintends or who have 
rendered other light professional services or bestowed 
labor shall have a lien upon the property upon or 
concerning which they shall rendered service, performed 
labor or furnished materials for the value of the 
services rendered, labor performed or materials furnishe 
by each respectively, whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as 
agent", contractor or otherwise. 
38-1-5- Utah Code Annotated: Priorities Over 
Other Encumberances. 
The liens herein provided for shall relate back 
to and take effect as of the time of the commence-
ment to do work or furnish materials on the ground for 
the structure or improvement and shall have priority 
over any lien, mortgage, or other encumberance which 
may have attached subsequently to the time when the 
building, improvement or structure was commenced, work 
begun, or first materials furnished on the ground; also, 
over any lien mortgage or other encumberance of which 
the lien holder has no notice and which was'unrecorded 
at the time the building structure or improvement 
was commenced, work begun or first material furnished 
on the ground. 
9 2 2 Utah 652 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES ' A*A? fM ? 
sufficient to form a binding contract with-
out the required tender of earnest money 
Tne judgment of the trial court is affirmed 
No costs are awarded 
HOWE, J , concurs in the result 
HALL, C J , and STEWART and OAKS, 
J J , concur 
( £ | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
CALDER BROS COMPANY, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Ross L ANDERSON, Signs, Inc , Dunn 
Construction Co, Jarvis Electric Co, 
Michael Crowley, Michael Crowley dba 
Star Palace, Star Palace, Inc., et a l , 
Defendants and Appellants 
JARVIS & SONS ELECTRIC CO, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Y 
Ross L. ANDERSON and Brent Weeks, 
et a l , Defendants 
DUNN CONSTRUCTION CO, and Roy-
den, Inc., Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Ross L. ANDERSON and Allison Ander-
son, Brent C Weeks and Western 
Star Palace, Inc, Defendants. 
Nos. 17419, 17458 and 12459. 
Supreme Court opMjtaJ/ 
Aug 24, 1982 
A moitgige foreclosure action was con-
solidated with two other actions brought by 
independent contractors to foreclose their 
mechanics' liens on the same property The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, George 
E Balhf, J , entered judgment in favor of 
the mortgagee Appeals were taken The 
Supreme Court, Stewart, J , held that (1) 
there was ample support for the determina-
tion that the hens in favor of the indepen-
dent contractors did not attach prior to the 
mortgage and did not have priority over the 
mortgage, (2) the mortgage foreclosure ac-
tion was not so inextricably intertwined 
with an Idaho bankruptcy case as to be 
stayed by the bankruptcy case, and (3) the 
order appointing a receiver did not go be-
yond the permissible bounds of the scope of 
a receivership 
Affirmed 
1. Mechanics' Liens <*=>3 
Purpose of Mechanics' Lien Act is re-
medial in nature and seeks to provide pro-
tection to laborers and materialmen who 
have added directly to value of property of 
another by their materials or labor U C A 
1953, 38-1-5 
2 Mechanics' Liens <^ =>168 
Phrase "commencement to do work" as 
used in mechanics' lien statute is construed 
in favor of hen claimants U C A 1953, 38-^ 
1-5 
3 Mechanics' Liens <&=*173 
Materialmen's or mechanics' liens re-
sulting from materials furnished or labor 
performed relate back to and attach as of 
date of commencement of first work on 
improvement or structure involved U C A 
1953, 38-1-5 
4 Mechanics* Liens <s=>173 
For one contractor's hen to relate back 
to commencement of work or supplying of 
materials by another contractor, both con-
tractors' projects must have been per-
formed in connection with what is essential-
ly single project performed under common 
plan prosecuted with reasonable promptness 
and without material abandonment, ordi-
nary maintenance or cleanup work does not 
serve as basis for "tacking" so as to fix 
earlier hen date for labor and materials 
supplied U C A 1953, 38-1-5 
5 Mortgages <3=* 151(3) 
Liens of contractors could not be 
"tacked" onto earlier date so as to have 
CALDER BROS. CO. v. ANDERSON 
Cite as, Utah, 652 PJ2d 922 
Utah 923 
priority over mortgage which attached in 
interim U C A 1953, 38-1-5 
6. Bankruptcy <*=»217(4) 
Involuntary bankruptcy petition filed 
againstindmdual in Idaho did not preclude 
mortgage foreclosure action in Utah where 
Utah action was not so inextricably inter-
woven with bankruptcy proceedings in Ida-
ho that proceedings had to be stayed in 
toto Bankr Code, 11 U S C A § 362(a) 
7. Judgment <e=>163 
Failure to file answer based on mistake 
of law raises issue of whether default judg-
ment should be set aside for mistake, inad-
vertence, surprise or excusable neglect, not 
under catchall exception allowing judgment 
to be set aside for any other reason justify-
ing relief from operation oflaw which may 
be filed up to three months after judgment, 
order or proceeding was entered or taken 
Rules Civ Proc, Rule 60(b)(l, 7) 
8. Appeal and Error <*=» 1043(4) 
Trial court did not commit reversible 
error in appointing receiver to take posses-
sion of property and to conduct business 
of corporate tenant where corporation was 
not stranger to underlying proceeding in 
which receiver was appointed Rules Civ 
Proc, Rule 66 
Robert L Stolebarger, of McDougal, Ha-
ley, Dahl & Stolebarger, Salt Lake City, for 
Star Palace 
John C Backlund, of Young, Backlund, 
Harris & Carter, Provo, for Dunn Const 
Dallas H Young, Jr , Brent D Young and 
Jerry L Reynolds, of Ivie & Young, Provo, 
for plaintiff and respondent 
STEWART, Justice 
In case No 17459 Calder Bros Company 
(Calder Bros) brought an action to fore 
close a $490,000 purchase money mortgage 
against real property sold to Ross Anderson 
This action was consolidated in the district 
court with two other actions brought by 
independent contractors to foreclose their 
meehanics' hens against the same property 
(Nos 17449 and 17458) The judgment in 
favor of Calder Bros in No 17459 is appeal-
ed by defendants Star Palace, Inc, Michael 
Crowley, and Signs, Inc, on the grounds 
that the lower court erred in entering de-
fault judgments against them, in denying 
Signs' motion to substitute Micro-Invest-
ment as the real party in interest, and in 
denying Star Palace's motion to vacate an 
order appointing a receiver Jarvis & Sons 
Electnc Co, Inc (Jarvis), Dunn Construc-
tion Co (Dunn), and Royden, Inc (Royden), 
appeal the district court's judgments in 
Nos 17449 and 17458, establishing Calder 
Bros' purchase money mortgage priority 
over their mechanics' liens 
I The Mortgage and the Mechanics' 
Liens (Nos 17449 and 1{458) 
On June 14, 1978, Calder Bros conveyed 
the reil property commonly known as the 
Star Palaee to Ross Anderson by warranty 
deed On the same day, Anderson executed 
and delivered a purchase money mortgage 
to Calder Bros The mortgage was not 
recorded until June 27, 1978 Shortly after 
the mortgage was recorded, a building per-
mit was obtained from Provo City to make 
improvements on the property based on a 
submitted set of plans 
After the deed and mortgage were exe-
cuted but before the mortgage was record-
ed, Anderson hired two young men on an 
hourly basis to help cut weeds, cut down 
two trees, and grout cracks in the building 
They were paid $18 95 for their labor In 
addition, a painter was hired to paint the 
building with paint supplied by an associate 
of Anderson He was paid $850 No me-
chanics' liens were filed as a result of any 
of the above described woik 
After Calder Bros ' mortgage was recoid-
ed, Anderson hired Jaivis to perform elec-
trical work, Dunn to resurface the parking 
area around the building, and Ro>den to 
furnish labor and materials On this ap-
peal, they claim that the trial court erred in 
holding that their mechanics' liens were 
subsequent in priority to the purchase mon-
ey mortgage and that their puonty should 
be established as of the commencement of 
the maintenance work which occurred prior 
to the recording of the mortgage 
9 2 4 Utah 652 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 38-1-5 provides 
the guidelines for determining the priority 
of the liens in Ujis case. That section pro-
vides: 
Priority—Over other encumbrances.— 
The liens herein provided for shall relate 
back to, and take effect as of, the time of 
the commencement to do work or furnish 
materials on the ground for the structure 
or improvement, and shall have priority 
over an} lien, mortgage or other encum-
brance which may have attached subse-
quently to the time when the building, 
improvement or structure was com-
menced, work begun, or first material 
furnished on the ground; also over any 
lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of 
which the lien holder had no notice and 
which was unrecorded at the time the 
building, structure or improvement was 
commenced, work begun, or first material 
furnished on the ground— . 
[1-3] The purpose of the mechanics 
act is remedial in nature and seeks to proJ 
vide protection to laborers and materialmen 
who have added directly to the value of thel / 
property of another by their materials or\ 
labor. First of Denver Mortgage Investors \ 
v. Zundel and Assoc., Utah, 600 P.2d 521 J 
(1979); Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 
Utah 114, 167 P. 241 (1917). To accomplish 
that purpose, the phrase "commencement to 
do work," as used in the mechanics' lien 
statute, is construed in favor of lien claim-
ants. Bankers Trust Co. v. EI Paso Pre-
st Co., 192 Colo. 468, 560 P.2d 457 (1977). 
e also First of Denver Mortgage Inves-
tors, supra. Materialmen's and mechanics' 
liens resulting from materials furnished or 
labor performed relate back to and attach 
as of the date of the commencement of the 
first work on the improvement or structure 
involved. First of Denver Mortgage Inves-
supra. 
plying of materials by another contractor 
however, both contractors' projects must 
have been performed in connection with 
what is essentially a single project per-
formed under a common plan -prosecuted 
with reasonable promptness and without 
material abandonment. See, e.g., Miller 
Electric Co. of Miami, Inc. v. Sweeny, Fla. 
App., 199 So.2d 734 (19G7); National Lum-
ber Co. v. Farmer & Son, Inc., 251 Minn. 
100, 87 N.W.2d 32 (1957); Fryman v. 
McGhec, 108 Ohio App. 501, 163 N.E2d 63 
(1958}_j Ordinary maintenance or cleanujT"^ 
work does not serve as a basis for "tacking" / 
so as to fix an earlier lien date under ( 
J § 38-1-5 for labor and materials supplied. \ 
[ 57C.J.S. MechaqicsJJejjs^jm Q^^l- ' 
[5] The building permit, applied for 
June 20, 1978, a date preceding the record-
ing of Caider Bros.' mortgage, was issued 
June 28, 1978,, a date subsequent^!*!-thfi 
recording. prawings made in November,! 
Fl977, and later submitted with the applica-/ ^zP^*? 
tion for a building permit, disclosed altera-j i&d*^** 
tions principally related to the interior of] 
the building.! "The oiity^exTerior improve-
[4] For one contractor's lien to relate 
back to the commencement of work or sup-
1. Generally, the presence of building materials 
upon the land or other visible evidence of work 
performed provides notice to any interested 
party that work has commenced. Western 
Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Co., 18 
ment shown is a drawing of a building with 
a peaked roof to replace the existing flat 
roof. 
Nothing in the plans suggested that the 
painting and maintenance work was part of 
an improvement project envisioned by the 
new owners. The work performed prior to 
the recording of Caider Bros.' mortgage 
included painting the building exterior, cut-
ting down two trees, clearing weeds, and 
placing grout in the building. At no point 
up to and including the time Caider Bros.' 
mortgage was recorded, was it evident from 
the inspection of the premises that an im-
provement had been commenced.1 No ma-
terials were delivered to the premises prior 
to the recording of Caider Bros.' mortgage. 
The trial court found that the cleanup 
and painting were insubstantial and consti-
tuted ordinary and necessary maintenance 
Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967), H B. Deal 
Construction Co. v. Labor Discount Center, 
Inc., Mo, 418 S.W2d 940 (1967). Compare 
First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel 
and Assoc, Utah, 600 P.2d 521 (1979). 
CALDER BROS. CO. v. ANDERSON 
Cite AS, Utah, 652 P-2d 922 
Utah 925 
rather than the commencement of an im-
provement to the building within the mean-
ing of the mechanics' lien statute. In addi-
tion, the court found that improvements to 
the exterior of the building subsequent to 
the recording of Caider Bros.' mortgage 
rendered the painting "to a large measure 
valueless." Therefore, it follows that Jar-
vis & Sons, Dunn, and Royden could not 
establish the date of their liens as of the 
commencement of the general maintenance 
and c!ean_uj)_woxK. , - . 
In sum, there is ample support in the 
record to support the trial court's findings 
that the liens in favor of Jarvis, Dunn, and 
Royden did not attach prior to the Caider 
Bros.' mortgage and do not have priority 
over the mortgage. 
II. Default Judgments and 
Receivership (No. 17459) 
Caider Bros, commenced an action on Au-
gust 21, 1979, against Anderson to foreclose 
the purchase money mortgage. Signs, Inc., 
another party with an interest in the prop-
erty, and Michael Crowley, acting for and 
on behalf of Star Palace, the party to whom 
Anderson assigned his interest in the prop-
erty earlier that year, were also named 
defendants.2 Star Palace, however, was not 
initially made a party to the action. On 
October 15, 1979, Caider Bros, served an 
amended complaint naming Star Palace a 
defendant. On October 31, 1979, two weeks 
after an involuntary petition in bankruptcy 
was filed against Anderson in the United 
States Court of Bankruptcy for Idaho, a 
default judgment was entered against Mi-
chael Crowley in the foreclosure action.3 
Approximately two months later, default 
judgments were entered against Star Pal-
ace and Signs. 
2. On October 17, 1979, Signs assigned its inter-
est in the property to Micro-Investment, an 
entity not a party to this action. On December 
5, 1979, Micro-Investment filed an answer to 
the amended complaint claiming to be the real 
party in interest although it had not been 
named as a defendant and had not sought an 
order allowing substitution of parties or inter-
vention. 
On October I, 1979, Crowley, again acting for 
and on behalf of Star Palace, apparently en-
tered into an agreement with Anderson to re-
in January, 1980, Star Palace objected to 
a trial setting on the ground that the pro-
ceedings against Ross Anderson had been 
stayed as a result of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. On May 29, 1980, Star Palace, 
Crowley and Signs moved to set aside the 
default judgments taken against them, and 
Signs moved to substitute Micro-Invest-
ment as a party in its stead. On August 14, 
1980, the trial court denied these motions. 
Crowley, Star Palace and Signs argue 
^*that the court erroneously entered default 
[judgments against them. They cite the 
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1979), 
iwhich provides in pertinent part: 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of 
this section, a petition filed under section 
301, 302, or 303 of this title operates as a 
stay, applicable to all entities, of— 
(1) the commencement or continuation, 
including the issuance or employment 
of process, of a judicial, administrative, 
or other proceeding against the debtor 
that was or could have been com-
menced before the commencement of 
the case under this title, or to recover a 
claim against the debtor that arose be-
fore the commencement of the case un-
der this title; 
(2) the enforcement, apainst the debtor 
or against property of the estate, of h 
judgment obtained before the com-
mencement of the case under this title; 
(3) any act to obtain possession of 
property of the estate or of property 
from the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or en-
force any lien against property of the' 
estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or en-
force against property of the debtor 
sctnd the assignment of interest in the real 
property. 
3. It appears that on November 16, 1979, Crow-
ley deeded all the interest he had in the proper-
ty to Star Palace and Star Palace deeded its 
interest in the premises to Ross Anderson. Al-
though the deed was not recorded, it was deliv-
ered to the trustee in bankruptcy apparently to 
enable the trustee to acquire jurisdiction over 
the Star Palace properties. 
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2. Mechanics* Lien» *=»35 
FIRST OF DENVER MORTGAGE 
INVESTORS and Citibank, NJL, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
C. N. ZUNDEL AND ASSOCIATES, a 
limited partnership, et al., Defendants 
and Respondents. 
FIRST OF DENVER MORTGAGE 
INVESTORS, et al.. Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 
v. 
C. N. ZUNDEL AND ASSOCIATES, a lim-
ited partnership, Bland Brothers, Inc., et 
al., Defendants and Appellant 
Nos. 15696, 16051. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 24, 1979. 
Appeal was taken in separate but relat-
ed proceedings in the Second District Court, 
Davis County, J. Duffy Palmer, J., involv-
ing allocation of priorities between mortga-
gees foreclosing against real property and 
competing lien claimants who provided 
services and materials for improvements to 
the property. The Supreme Court, Stew-
art, J., held, inter aha, that the trial court 
properly determined that the mechanics' 
and materialman's liens had priority over 
the trust deed. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
1. Mechanics' Liens «*=»43 ~~/S 
It is not necessary to attachment of 
mechanics' lien that matenal or labor be 
furnished solely on building structure or 
that work be performed solely on lot on 
which building is being erected, and con-
tractor should not be barred from enjoying 
benefits of mechanics' lien statute where 
his work not only enhances value of devel-
oper's land but is also necessary to make 
residences to be built on sucfrjyroperty hab-
itable. U.C.A.1953, 38-1 
••£*> 
Contractor was entitled to mechanics' 
lien in connection with construction project 
on 44-acre subdivision for its services in 
locating existing lines and putting in pipe-
line, water and sewer systems and storm 
drains. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-3. 
3. Mechanics' Liens *=»173 
Where mortgage loan involved blanket ? 
mortgage covering entire 44-acre subdivi- .'.* 
sion comprising single dwelling lota and <! 
condominiums, and initial work of contrac-
tor in locating existing lands and putting in 
pipelines, water and sewer systems and 
storm drains related to and benefited entire 
subdivision, such work could not be charac-
terized as being "off-site" improvements 
that would not impart notice to lenders; 
therefore, mechanics' liens arising from fur-
nishing of materials and labor both on over-
all development site and on individual con-
dominium units within development related 
back to initial work done on project U.C. 
A.1953, § 38-1-3. 
4. Mechanics' Liens «=»208 
To be valid and binding, waiver or re-
lease or mechanics' lien by contractor 
agreement must be supported by legal con-
sideration; when contractor received cash 
and property in exchange for release of 
lien, its release of lien rights was therefore 
binding as to those rights accrued up t£f~* 
time of release. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-3. V * 
5. Mechanics' Liens <*=»166 
Where work of all other lien claimants 
on construction project was completed prior 
to date on which one claimant released its 
lien in exchange for cash and property, and 
other claimants' rights had already at-
tached, such other claimants, who were not 
parties to relief and did not consent to its 
terms, were not affected by relief and such 
other lien claimants were entitled to same 
priority date as that originally accorded to 
releasing claimant. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-3, 
38-1-10. 
6. Stipulations «=>3 
Courts are ordinarily bound by stipula-
tions between parties, but such is not case 
when points of law requiring judicial deter-
mination are involved. 
^ 
•\ 
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any lien to the extent that such lien 
secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this 
title; 
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover 
a claim against the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the case 
under this title; 
[6] The federal law of bankruptcy su-
persedes state law to the extent necessary 
to further the objectives of administering 
the estates of bankrupts. Butner v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 48, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 
136 (1979). However, we see nothing in 
.".•!Action 362(a) which acts to stay Calder 
^-»ros . ' action against Star Palace, Signs, and 
Crowley. Section 362(a) may, in certain 
circumstances, stay judicial proceedings 
against not only the debtor in bankruptcy 
but also co-defendants when the allegations 
against them arise from the same factual 
and legal basis and are inextricably inter-
woven. Federal Life Insurance Co. (Mutu-
al) v. First Financial Group of Texas, 3 B.R. 
375 (S.D.Texas 1980). But neither the 
terms of the statute nor the nature of the 
case requires that co-defendants not file an 
answer. If a stay were to appear appropri-
ate thereafter, a motion to the trial court 
would suffice. We do not think the action 
against Star Palace, Crowley and Signs was 
so inextricably interwoven with the bank-
ruptcy proceedings against Anderson that 
the proceedings in the Calder Bros.' case 
/.'fjV.d to be stayed in toto. Accordingly, the 
^ •;;" v *ault judgments against the defendants 
^ w e r e properly enforced. 
[7] Star Palace, Crowley and Signs also 
contend that if the default judgments are 
valid, the trial court erred in not setting 
those judgments aside. A default judg-
4. An "entry of default" may be set aside under 
rule 55(c) "for good cause shown by the court." 
Once a judgment by default has been entered, 
however, it may be set aside only in accordance 
with rule 60(b). 
5. See Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, Utah, 546 P.2d 
888 (1976), where the Court held that a request 
to set aside a decree made five months after 
judgment was properly denied as untimely. 
ment may be set aside under rule 60(b) for 
the following reasons:4 
Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable 
Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; 
Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice, relieve a party or 
his legal representative from a final judg-
ment, order, or proceeding for the follow-
ing reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or ex-
cusable neglect; . . . 
(7) any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), 
not more than three months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was en-
tered or taken. 
Star Palace, Crowley and Signs contend 
that they complied with the three-month 
time limitation applicable to rule 60(bXl). 
They argue that the default judgment did 
not become effective until the day the auto-
matic stay was lifted. Since there was no 
stay in effect, however, the argument fails. 
Appellants also rely on subsection (7) of 
rule 60(b). A motion to set aside a judg-
ment under that provision need only be 
made "within a reasonable time." There-
fore, if the motion is well founded under 
rule 60(b)(7), it may be timely. However, 
rule 60(b)(7) is not available to one who 
should have filed under rule 66(b)(1) but did 
not. See Ackerman v. United States, 340 
U.S. 193, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950); 
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 69 
S.Ct. 304, 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949); 7 J. Moore & 
J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice, § 60.42 
(2d ed. 1982).5 The failure to file an answer 
based on a mistake of law raises a rule 
60(b)(1) issue and therefore the motion to 
But see Ney v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 
P.2d 1114 (1956), where the Court upheld the 
trial court's discretion to regard a situation in 
which defendant had mistakenly believed she 
was fully protected by the divorce decree or-
dering her ex-husband to pay any real estate 
commission arising from the sale of an apart-
ment as among the class of cases that rule 
60(b)(7) was intended to govern. 
STATE v. BALLENBERGER 
Cite as, Utah, 652 P.2d 927 
set aside the judgment was properly de- August 21, 1979, 
nied.6 
[8] Finally, it is argued that the lower 
court committed reversible error in denying 
Star Palace's motion to vacate the order 
appointing a receiver since it went beyond 
the permissible bounds of the scope of a 
receivership. Calder Bros.' motion to ap-
point a receiver to take possession of the 
property and to conduct the business of the 
tenant, Star Palace, was granted by the 
trial court October 4, 1979, pursuant to Rule 
66, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
court later denied Star Palace's motion to 
vacate the order appointing a receiver. 
Star Palace relies on Smith v. McCul-
lough, 104 U.S. 25, 26 L.Ed. 637 (1881), in 
which the Court held that the receiver was 
properly appointed only as to the property 
covered by the mortgage. Star Palace ar-
gues that its business constitutes property 
not covered by the mortgage. In addition, 
Star Palace relies on Keyser v. Erickson, 61 
Utah 179, 211 P. 698 (1922), which held that 
property may not be taken from'a person in 
possession pursuant to a court order unless 
the person in possession had been accorded 
his day in court. 
Calder Bros, responds by arguing that the 
issue is untimely raised since more than one 
month lapsed between the order denying 
the motion to vacate the order, appointing 
the receiver and the notice of intent to 
appeal the judgment. We need not deter-
mine the timeliness of raising the issue, 
since, even if timely raised, Star Palace 
fails on the merits of its claim. 
Neither Smith v. McCuIlough nor Keyser 
v. Erickson is on point. Unlike McCuI-
lough, the receivership in this case does not 
extend to more property than is involved in 
the underlying litigation, and unlike Keys-
er, Star Palace, the party opposing the re-
ceivership, was not a stranger to the pro-
ceeding. Not only were Michael Crowley 
and Michael Crowley dba Star Palace 
named parties in the initial complaint filed 
Utah 927 
but Star Palace was 
named in the order appointing a receiver 
filed October 4, 1979, and was a named 
party in the amended complaint filed Octo-
ber 9,1979, one month before the trial court 
signed the amended order appointing a re-
ceiver on November 9, 1979. 
Affirmed. Costs to respondents. 
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
and 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
James E. BALLENBERGER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 17619. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 25, 1982. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Jay E. 
Banks, J., of theft of property valued over 
$1,000, and he appealed. The Supreme 
Court held that: (1) considering lateness of 
the hour, suspicious movements of defend-
ant and his companion, and fact that offi-
cers had been advised of the high rate of 
burglaries in the area, together with unob-
structed view of C.B. equipment in back of 
defendant's car, police officers were justi-
fied in making further investigation and 
had probable cause to arrest defendant for 
theft after defendant's companion admitted 
the theft and implicated defendant; (2) 
warrantless seizure of contraband from de-
6. Having upheld the default judgment, we find 
no merit in Signs' argument that the court 
erred in denying its motion to substitute Micro-
Investment as Signs' transferee of interest pur-
suant to Rule 25, Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. The court properly denied the motion 
since it was filed subsequent to the default 
judgment. 
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7. Stipulations *=»13, 16 
Parties are bound by their stipulations 
unless relieved therefrom by court, which 
has power to set aside stipulation entered 
into inadvertently or for justifiable cause 
8. Appeal and Error *=»846(5) 
Where, in proceedings involving priori-
ty of mechanics' hen claims versus claims of 
mortgagee, record contained no findings as 
to validity or effect of one claimant's stipu-
lation waiving its hen, Supreme Court 
would not consider such matter for first 
time on appeal 
9 Stipulations <*=»n(2) 
Whatever effect of stipulation by me-
chanics' henholder concerning lien's priority 
status with reference to trust deed, other 
hen claimants who sought priority over 
trust deed were in no way bound by stipula-
tion to which they were not parties 
10. Appeal and Error <s=» 790(2) 
Appeal involving priority of mechanics' 
lien claimants with references to trust deed 
on construction project was not moot 
where, although sheriffs deed in foreclo-
sure had been issued to mortgagees, they 
had not paid amount bid into court as or-
dered and thus should not have received 
deed and lien claimants who had been ad-
judged to have first priority had not been 
paid Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
69(eX0 
11. Appeal and Error <s=» 337(1) 
Appeal involving issue of priority of 
mechanics' lien claims with reference to hen 
of deed of trust on construction project was 
not premature, despite fact that various 
cross claims and counterclaims had not been 
resolved by trial court, where such cross 
claims and counterclaims were unrelated to 
issue of hen priority and no further judicial 
action remained to be taken with respect to 
issues of priority and sale of property 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 54(b), 72(a) 
12 Mortgage* *=»575 
In proceedings involving foreclosure 
under dued of trust, trial court retained 
* - ~ o- »nfnrrement of its decree 
mmation regarding hen priorities where no 
supersedeas bond was posted prior to sher-
iff's sale or before motion was made to 
have sale vacated 
Richard H Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs and appellants in 15696 and for 
plaintiffs and respondents m 16051 
J Anthony Eyre, George H Speciale, 
Milo S Marsden, Jr , Albert J Colton, Rob-
ert S Howell, David H Schowbe, Richard 
C Davidson, Carvel R Shaffer, Salt Lake 
City, George K Fadel, Albert E Mann, 
Bountiful, John H Kelly, pro s e , LeRoy S 
Axland, Randy S Ludlow, Salt Lake City, 
for defendants and respondents in 15696 
Robert C Cummings, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and appellant in 16051 and for 
defendants and respondents in 15696 
Gordon A Madsen, Robert F Orton, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants and appellants in 
16051 
STEWART, Justice 
This appeal from the distnet court consol-
idates two separate but related proceedings 
These proceedings involve the allocation of 
priorities between mortgagees foreclosing 
against real property in Davis County, 
Utah, and competing hen claimants who 
provided services and materials for im-
provements to the property 
Plaintiffs, First of Denver Mortgage In-
vestors (' FDMI') and Citibank, N A , were 
granted a judgment against defendant 
Mountain Spnng3 by the trial court on De-
cember 20, 1977, in the amount of $2 358,-
396 08 The amount represented $1558,-
005 51 in outstanding principal and $800,-
390 57 in interest The judgment was se-
cured by a hen on the Lakeview Terrace 
subdivision The court's conclusions of law 
include the following 
4 Plaintiffs have stipulated in open 
court that they shall bid only the sum of 
one million nine hundred thousand for 
said property [at the sheriff's sale] and 
take no deficiency judgment against the 
c
 - «
 ra
 ^nnstruc-
FIRST OF DENVER MORTG. INVESTORS 
au*jfooFJdMi 
Uon Company, nor against any of the recorded on February 
C. N. ZUNDEL Utah 5 2 3 
individual guarantors 
The Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
states 
The priority of the mechanic's and mate-
rialmen's hens is reserved for future de-
termination and shall be set forth in a 
supplemental Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure to be entered prior to Sher-
iff's Sale 
The Decree further provides 
that the proceeds of sale be 
applied in payment of the Sheriff's cost 
of sale and thereafter to the parties in 
accordance with the priority to be deter-
mined by the court 
The court subsequently entered its order 
awarding priority to mechanics' hens 
claimed by eight defendants The appeal 
from that order by plaintiffs is Case No 
15696 in this Court 
In a consolidated case, No 16051, defend-
ant Bland Brothers, Inc ("Bland Bros") 
appeals from the lower court's denial of its 
motion to set aside the sheriff's sale held 
pursuant to the foreclosure action and rais-
es procedural issues in connection there-
with We shall examine first the common 
facts underlying these cases and then deal 
separately with the issues raised on appeal 
This litigation concerns a subdivision 
which originally comprised 44 acres in 
Bountiful, Utah, known as Lakeview Ter-
race subdivision A trust deed was record-
ed as to this property on August 1, 1973, 
when plaintiff FDMI made a loan of $450,-
000 to C N Zundel and Associates, a limited 
partnership In November 1973 defendant 
Child Brothers, Inc ("Child Bros") com-
menced the first^worlc on the propexLy-fox, 
« C N_ZujideJ JJThe work consisted of locat-J 
l ing existing lines and putting in pipeline,V 
j water and sewer systems, and storm drains J 
~
/J
 Subsequently; the original FDMl loan was 
refinanced, and the 1973 trust deed re-
leased, with FDMI advancing $1,500,000 to 
Zundel and several limited partners This 
amount was secured by a new trust deed 
1 On June 13 1979 orders of dismissal based 
on settlements between the parties were en 
tered in this Court dismissing the following 
19, 1974 The con-
atruction loan was for the financing of im-
provements on the 44-acre property, which 
was to comprise 54 single-family building 
sites and 69 condominium units The loan 
was due and payable on January 15, 1976 
On August 8, 1975, Zundel conveyed the 
property to Mountain Springs Construction 
Company, whose stockholders were the 
same individuals who had been Zundel's 
limited partners Because Zundel had be-
come delinquent on the FDMI loan, FDMI 
on September 8, 1975, filed its first com-
plaint for foreclosure In November FDMI 
concluded a supplemental loan agreement 
with Mountain Springs, the successor to 
C N Zundel and Associates, which modified 
the construction loan so as to require repay-
ment in installments in July 1976, October 
1976, July 1977, and December 1977 
The following hen claimants first per-
formed work on the Lakeview property for 
Mountain Springs on the dates indicated 
Child Bros, November 15, 19J3, Duncan 
Electric, January 22, 1975, Robert J War-
drop, December 1, 1975, Countertop Shop, 
Inc, March 9, 1976, Max D Scheel, April 
19, 1976, Ronald Graham Tile Co, March 
23, 1976, and Bland Bros, March 8, 1976 
Additionally, Holt-Witmer provided wallpa-
per and linoleum under contract with Zun-
del commencing January 1, 1975 Except 
for Child Bros, the hen claimants all per-
formed labor or furnished materials on vari-
ous condominium units situated on the 
property l 
In June 1976 Child Bros, as credit in the 
approximate amount of $22,000 toward the 
sum owed by Zundel and Mountain Springs, 
accepted a check for $13 210 and a warran-
ty deed to two lots in the subdivision 
FDMI's trust deed provided that the title to 
the property deeded to Child Bros would 
revert to FDMI if the required payment 
was not made by July 1, 1976 In exchange 
for the payment in cash and property, Child 
Bros executed a release of all hens and 
parties Child Bros Duncan Electric, Counter 
top Shop, and Holt Witmer 
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claims The release was recorded on June 
22, 1976 
Mountain Springs failed to pay the July 
1976 installment on its note to FDMI A 
partial assignment of the promissory note 
and trust deed from FDMI to Citibank, 
N A , was recorded on July 30, 1976, and 
FDMI and Citibank on August 2, 1976, filed 
an amended complaint seeking foreclosure 
of the property Mountain Springs answer-
ed, counter-claimed for damages, and filed 
a lis pendens against the property One 
year later Child Bros cross-claimed for 
money due and failure of warranty on the 
lots conveyed to it Subsequently, the 
plaintiffs and the hen claimant defendants 
moved for summary judgment 
Following the December 20, 1977, hear-
ing, plaintiffs were awarded a judgment 
against Mountain Springs the question of 
hen priority was reserved for later determi-
nation The sheriff's sale took place on 
January 19, 1978 Plaintiff FDMI bid 
$1,900,000 for the property, no higher bids 
were received On January 24, the court 
entered a Memorandum Decision awarding 
the hen claimants first priority over the 
plaintiffs That ruling involved total hens 
in t h e j ^ ^ p j r t e j j j u i i o ^ ^ ^ 
^making its ruling, the court in effect reject-
ed a stipulation signed by attorneys for 
Child Bros and FDMI on January 11, 1978, 
that Child Bros ' hen was junior to the trusj 
ideed /"The pro"vTsions or tKe Memorandum 
/Decision were embodied in the court's Order 
Granting Summary Judgment and Order 
Amending Certificate of Sale on February 
1, 1978 Pursuant to this order, the sher-
iffs certificate of sale was amended to 
change plaintiff s bid to $1,937 397 42 On 
February 16, 1978, following the entry of a 
summary judgment in favor of hen claim-
ant Holt Witmer, the court entered another 
order requiring "that the sheriffs certifi-
cate of sale shall be amended to show that 
plaintiffs bid for the property is the sum of 
$1,944,732 8 6 " 
Child Bros ' cross-claim and counterclaims 
against Zundel, Mountain Springs, and 
plaintiffs were dismissed following a trial 
on February 1, 1978 Child Bros ' counsel 
was not present at the trial for reasons set 
out in an affidavit filed with Child Bros ' 
appellate brief 
On these facts, the plaintiffs FDMI and 
Citibank m Case No 15696 seek reversal of 
the summary judgment dated February 1, 
1978, awarding the named hen claimants 
priority over plaintiffs' trust deed 
Plaintiffs contend that hens for materials 
furnisned for construction in Lakeview Ter-
race could not relate back to the date of the 
first work commenced on November 15 
1973, by Child Bros for two_bi<Mc reasons I 
First, plaintiffs characterize Child Bros 
work as 'off site improvements" a*5d irgue , 
that hens arising subsequent to such lm- j 
provements and after the recording of I 
plaintiffs trust deed which relate to specif J 
IC structures cannot relate back to the date! 
of the commencement of ChiId_BrosJ_work/ 
Second plaintiffs rely on Child Bros' re{ 
lease of its cla ms to a hen for work per-\ 
formed prior to June 17, 1976 Plaintiffs) 
further argue that the work done in Octo-
ber 1976 by Child Bros was not under the 
same contract as work done previously by 
Child Bros on Lakeview Terrace and was 
therefore, as stipulated by Child Bros , jun-
ior and subordinate to plaintiffs' trust deed 
•Whether" the ' lo"v7er~""court decided the 
question of hen priority properly depends 
on a consideration of several propositions of 
law underlying plaintiffs' contentions 
* The first issue is whether the improve-
ments by Child Bros met the general statu-
tory requirements under Utah law for the ^^^ 
attachment of mechanics' hens The Utah f J 
hen statute § 38-1-3,* lists the following y 7 ^ - ] M ) 
persons among those entitled to a mechan- \~S 
ICS hen Contractors, subcontractors and i A <\£<Jtf7 
all persons performing any services or fur- ^ - , 
nishmg any materials used in the construe 3 
tion, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to 
any premises m any manner " 
"The purpose of the hen statutes is to 
protect those who have added directly to 
the value of property by performing labor 
2 AH statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended 
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or furnishing materials upon it," Stanton 
Transportation Co v Davis, 9 Utah 2d l84 . 
34i-P^2d-.2Q7^2Q941959^r"The broaTV 
anguage, "improvement to any premises i n / 
any manner/j^ncompal^cs^nTlnstant^ase 
where sewer and water systems were in-
stalled on the subject property 
[1,2] It is not necessary to the attach-
ment of a mechanics' hen that the material 
or labor be furnished solely on a building 
structure or that the work be performed 
solely on the lot on_which a building is 
bemg-erected / W e agree with~the~New - \ 
Jersey Supreme Court, which stated in J R 
Christ Construction Co v Willete Assocs, 
47 N J 473, 221 A 2d 538 (1966), that a 
contractor should not be barred from enjoy-
ing the benefits of the mechanics' hen stat-
ute where his work not only enhances the 
value of the developer's land, but is also 
necessary to make residences to be built on J 
1 such property habitable .^He~~court "held 
*T?T2r~whcre" a developer engages the con-
tractor to install a sewer system for a sub-
division project, the contractor, if he com-
plies with required statutory procedures, is 
entitled to a mechanics' hen against the 
developers property for the cost of labor 
and materials furnished The New Jersey 
Court cited Ladue Contracting Co v Land 
Development Co_, 337 S W_2d 578JMo App 
1960)f in emphasizing the fact that water jj 
/ and sewer systems are essential to the com J 
j fortable and convenient use of dwellings 
and that it would be "turn[ing] the clock 
back to another century" to hold that such 
improvements are outside the terms of the 
hen statute (Id at 585)_ -J 
^"TRe second issue is whether the priority 
of matenalmen s hens is different with re-
spect to a blanket construction loan for a 
subdivision comprising single dwelling lots 
and condominiums as compared with a con-
struction loan for a single dwelling in a 
subdivision where there may have been 
"off site improvements that would not im-
part notice to lenders of the latter t>pe of 
loan Pluntiffs rely on this Courts deci 
sion in Western Mortgage Loan Corp v 
Cottonwooii Construction Co, 18 Utah 2d 
409, 424 P2d 437 (1907), to support their 
argument that our mechanic*' hen statute 
provides that hens are to date back only to 
the time each individual structure waa com-
menced 
Western Mortgage involved the relative 
priorities of mechanics' hens and a construc-
tion mortgage on a single lot in a subdivi-
sion The question waa whether hen claim-
ants who had furnished labor or materials 
that went into the construction of the house 
on that single lot were entitled to tack for 
priority purposes to work comprising "off-
site improvements," i e , the laying out the 
subdivision and the installation of water 
lines, sewer, curb and gutter, and street 
paving done earlier in connection with the 
subdivision as a whole The hen claimants 
cited § 38-1-5, which reads in part as fol-
lows 
Pnonty—Over other encumbrances — 
The hens herein provided for shall relate 
back to, and take effect as of, the time of 
the commencement to do work or furnish 
materials on the ground for the structure 
or improvement, and shall have pnonty 
over any hen, mortgage or other encum-
brance which may have attached subse-
quently to the time when the building, 
improvement or structure was com-
menced, work begun, or first material 
furnisbed-^n~the-grot tn4-^_^^_ , 
jfThis Court held that the recorded construe 
/ tion mortgage took pnonty over the me 
chanics' hens because m that case the hens 
[ could not relate back to the date of com 
mencement of off site improvements^ The 
"^asioTTresTed on the~issue"oTnotice The 
Court stated, 18 Utah 2d at 412, 424 P 2d at 
439 • ' — 
/ The presence of materials on the build 
/ ing site or evidence on the ground that 
i work has commenced on a structure or 
j preparatory thereto is notice to a)) the 
\ world that hens may have attached j 
\ However" the off site construction in de-
veloping the subdivision for building sites 
would not necessanly bring to the atten 
tion of a lender that someone is claiming 
a hen on a particular lot in the subdivi 
sion This is especially true as in this 
case, where the lender advanced money 
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to build a home long after the subdivision 
had been laid out and developed. 
[3] The instant case, however, is distin-
guishable from Western Mortgage. Here 
we are not dealing with a lender who made 
a loan on a single lot within a subdivision 
and who had no reason to be on notice as to 
the existence of prior work. In this case, 
the initial work performed by Child Bros, 
related to and benefited the entire subdivi-
sion. The mortgage loan in question was a 
blanket mortgage covering the entire subdi-
vision. Because the initial work was per-
formed over substantial portions of the 
property involved, it could notjpjrop_erly__be 
^h^acjejnzed-a3^^nTg^3f£-site^l-as. w_ere * 
^he^improvements in Western Mortgage in 
relation to the property that was the sub-
ject of the construction loan. Furthermore, 
the claimant of the mechanics' lien in West-
ern Mortgage performed the labor on a lot 
entirely separate from the initial work. In 
the present case the claimants performed 
their work on the same site, i. e., the 44 
acres covered by FDMI's construction loan. 
Plaintiffs also cite Aladdin Heating Corp. 
v. Trustees of Cent. States, Nevada, 563 
P.2d 82 (1977), in which the court refused to 
relate mechanics' liens back to pre-construc-
tion architectural, soil testing, and survey 
work. The court in Aladdin required "visi-
ble signs of construction to inform prospec-
tive lenders [who inspected] the premises 
that liens had attached," and the work per-
formed in that case and others cited therein 
resulted in nothing that would put a lender 
on notice because of the visibility of the 
work. In the instant case Child Bros, laid 
water line and sewer pipe for the subdivi-
sion, commencing its first work on Novem-
ber 15, 1973. The trial court made no spe-
cific findings as to the visibility of Child 
Bros.' work at the time the loan agreement 
was entered into, and this issue was not 
raised or argued by plaintiffs. The work 
done by Child Bros , however was conceded-
ly more substantial than that done in Alad-
din. Accordingly, Aladdin is distinguisha-
ble from the present case. 
Based on our statute and the issues sub-
mitted by the parties, the materialmen with 
valid liens stand, in this case, on equal 
footing in dating their liens from the time 
work commenced. We therefore hold that 
the mechanics' liens arising from the fur-
nishing of materials and labor both on the 
overall development site and on individual 
condominium units within the development 
relate back to the initial work done on the 
project by Child Bros. 
A third issue involves the effect of Child 
Bros.' execution in June 1976 of a document 
titled "Release of All Liens and Claims" 
pertaining to the Lakeview property. The 
notarized release document recited that for 
a valuable consideration Child Brothers, 
Inc., by its president, Eugene Child, who 
signed the document, "release[d] and dis-
charge[d]" Mountain Springs, FDMI, Zun-
del, and the Lakeview subdivision property, 
from any and all liens, claims, demands, 
damages, actions at law or in equity 
arising out of any contractual or other 
relationship . . . and/or claims of 
liens, arising or accruing on or before 
[date omitted], or existing on that 
date . and all matters involved 
in any and all claims of liens for all labor 
performed upon, and all materials fur-
nished to [the Lakeview subdivision prop-
erty] arising on or before, or existing on, 
the date specified above, by the under-
signed, and by all agents, employees, sup-
pliers, [etc.] . all of whom the 
undersigned hereby warrants have been 
fully paid, and none of whom has any 
further claim or lien against such real 
estate as of the date specified above. 
That the parties hereto intend hereby 
that this Release of All Liens and Claims 
shall be a. final and complete release and 
discharge of [Mountain Springs, FDMI, 
Zundel, and the Lakeview bulnhvision] by 
the undersigned, [his heirs, assigns, 
agents, employees, etc }, and all other per-
sons performing labor upon or furnishing 
materials . as of the date speci-
fied above, at the instance of the under-
signed. 
The document was dated June 17, 1976, it 
was recorded on June 22, 1976. 
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As this Court stated in upholding the 
waiver of lien rights in Dwyer v. Salt Lake 
City Copper Mfg. Co., 14 Utah 339, 344, 47 
P. 311, 312 (1896), "A mechanic's lien is a 
privilege conferred by statute, and ordinari-
ly may be waived by express agreement of 
the party in whose favor it exists." The 
legitimacy of a release of lien rights was 
also recognized in G. Chicoine Contractors, 
Inc. v. John Marshal Bldg. Corp., 77 111. 
App.2d 437, 222 N.E.2d 712, 714 (1966), 
where the court stated, "One right the lien 
claimant has is to execute his full and gen-
eral waiver releasing his rights to a me-
chanic's lien against the property." The 
court then quoted the following language 
from Decatur Lumber and Mfg. Co. v. Crail, 
350 111. 319, 324, 183 N.E. 228, 230 (1932): 
While a waiver of lien for a clearly ex-
pressed special purpose will be confined 
by the courts to the purpose intended, 
yet, where a general waiver is executed, 
and there is nothing in the context to 
show a contrary intention, there is noth-
ing left for the court to do but enforce 
the contract as the parties have made it. 
[4] To be valid and binding a waiver or 
release of a mechanics' lien by contract or 
agreement must be supported by a legal 
consideration. Kelly v. Johnson, 251 III. 
135, 95 N.E. 1068 (1911); Skidmore v. Eby, 
57 N.M. 669, 262 P.2d 370 (1953). Child 
Bros, received cash and property in ex-
change for the release. Its release of lien 
rights is therefore binding as to those rights 
accrued up to the time of the release, at 
least as to it. 
[5] As to the lien claimants left in the 
case, all their work on the project was com-
pleted prior to the date of Child Bros.' 
release. Their lien rights had already at-
tached. These lienholders were not parties 
to the release, did not consent to its terms, 
and are not in the category of subcontrac-
tors or materialmen performing labor or 
furnishing materials at the instance of 
Child Bros, and therefore the release does 
not affect their status as lienholders They 
are entitled to the same priority date as 
that originally accorded Child Bros, whose 
work was the first done on the project, in 
accordance with U.C.A. § 38-1-10, which 
provides: 
The liens for work and labor done or 
material furnished as provided in this 
chapter shall be upon an equal footing, 
regardless of date of filing the notice and 
claim of lien and regardless of the time of 
performing such work and labor or fur-
nishing such material. 
A final issue relating to lien priority ii, 
this case is whether the stipulation that 
Child's lien was junior to plaintiffs' had any 
binding legal effect. The stipulation was 
signed by attorneys for FDMI and Child 
Bros, on the 11th of January, 1978. I t 
states that Child Bros, released its lien 
against the Lakeview property and that 
Child Bros, was the grantee in a warranty 
deed recorded June 22, 1976, covering Lots 
59 and 60, Lakeview Terrace. The second 
paragraph states: 
Said parties hereby stipulate that the 
warranty deed is junior and subordinate 
to the lien or [sic] plaintiff's Trust Deed 
and that defendant Child Bros. Inc. has a 
lien in the sum of $13,450.52 which lien is 
junior and subordinate to plaintiff'3 Trust 
Deed. [Emphasis added.] 
[6,7] Ordinarily, courts are bound by 
stipulations between parties, Koron v. 
Myers, 87 Idaho 567, 394 P.2d 634 (1964), 
Riordan v. Commercial Travelers Mut. In * 
Co., 11 Wash App. 707, 525 P.2d 804 (1974). 
Such is not the case, however, when points 
of law requiring judicial determination are 
involved, Mobile Acres, Inc. v. Kurata, 211 
Kan 833, 508 P 2d 889 (1973), In Re EstAte 
of Maguire, 204 Kan. 686, 466 P.2d 358, 
modified 206 Kan. 1, 476 P.2d 618 (1970); 
Cox v. City of Pocatello, 77 Idaho 225, 291 
P 2d 282 (1955). Parties are bound by their 
stipulations unless relieved therefrom by 
the court, which has the power to set aside 
a stipulation entered into inadvertently or 
for justifiable cause, Klein v. Klein, Utah, 
544 P.2d 472 (1975); Johnson v. Peoples 
Finance & Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246, 272 
P2d 171 (1954); Guard v. County of Mari-
copa, 14 Ariz App. 187, 481 P.2d 873 (1971); 
Higby v. Higby, Colo App, 538 P.2d 493 
(1975); Thompson v. Turner, 98 Idaho 110, 
558 P.2d 1071 (1977). 
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[8,9] In the present case, the trial court 
apparently disregarded the stipulation of 
FDMI and Child Bros as to lien priority 
The record contains no findings as to the 
validity or effect of the stipulation, and this 
Court will not consider this matter for the 
first time on appeal Whatever the effect 
of the stipulation upon Child Bros ' priority 
status, the other hen claimants who sought 
priority over FDMI's trust deed are m no 
way bound by a stipulation to which they 
were not parties, Thomas v State, 57 Haw 
639, 562 P 2d 425 (1977) 
[10] Bland Bros, also a defendant in 
Case No 15696, raises the further issues 
thatt this appeal is both moot and prema-
ture Mootness is claimed because plaintiff 
FDMI has bid $1,944,732 86 3 for the proper-
ty at the sheriff's sale and is thus required 
to pay that amount to the sheriff pursuant 
to Rule 69{eX4), which states that every bid 
shall be deemed an irrevocable offer and 
that the purchaser is liable on such bid 
Because the amount bid would satisfy fully 
the claims of the lienors, as well as plain-
tiffs, defendants claim that the plaintiffs 
have no grounds for bringing an appeal 
Plaintiffs conceded that should someone 
pay the amount of $1,944,732 86 during the 
redemption period, the hen claimants would 
receive $44,732 86, and the appeal would 
become moot Otherwise, plaintiffs argue 
that this Court should determine the hen 
claimants to be junior and subordinate to 
their trust deed Bland Bros claims that 
the redemption period cannot expire where 
no payment has been made pursuant to the 
order of sale 
The record shows that plaintiffs them-
selves stipulated to the amount to be bid 
and moved the trial court on the 11th day 
of February, 1978, to amend the Sheriff's 
Certificate of Sale to provide that the total 
amount to be paid was $1,944,732 86, in the 
event that hen claimant Holt-Witmer was 
granted first priority An order was signed 
by the court so amending the certificate of 
sale Plaintiffs' objections at this point are 
3 Since this case is to be remanded to the trial 
court we leave to that court the determination 
of what effect the settlements made during the 
more a change of mind than a justifiable 
claim of error on the part of the trial court 
Although a sheriff's deed was issued to the 
plaintiffs, they, have not paid the amount 
bid into the court as ordered and thus 
should not have received a deed The lien 
claimants who had been adjudged to have 
first priority have not been paid The is-
sues raised herein are not moot 
[11] Defendant Bland Bros also argues 
that this appeal is premature because vari-
ous cross-claims and counterclaims have not 
been resolved Unless an appeal may be 
taken pursuant to Rule 54(b), U R C P , or 
our interlocutory appeal procedure, only "fi-
nal orders" are appealable to this Court, see 
Rule 72(a), U R C P Bland Bros claims 
that there was no final order until hen 
claimant Holt-Witmer's priority status was 
adjudicated on February 22, 1978 
The order of February 22, 1978, was an 
amendment to the order dated February 1, 
1978 Although the notice of appeal states 
that it is the February 1 order that is 
appealed, we deem that order to incorporate 
by amendment the order of February 22 
since it was entered prior to the filing of 
the notice of appeal Nonetheless, it is 
clear that certain cross claims and counter-
claims unrelated to the issue of hen priority 
remain to be adjudicated 
Whether an order is deemed a "final or-
der" is not necessarily dependent in all in-
stances upon whether all issues in a lawsuit 
have been adjudicated The test to be ap-
plied is a pragmatic test See Brown Shoe 
Co v Umteti States, 370 U S 294, 82 S Ct 
1502, 8 L Ed 2d 510 (1962), Wright, Federal 
Courts, 505 (3rd ed ) In the instant case no 
further judicial action remains to be taken 
with respect to the issues of priority and 
the sale of the property and, but for the 
appeal, sale of the property and disburse-
ment of the proceeds would occur To re-
quire the appeal to abide the determination 
of pending unrelated claims would make an 
appeal on the issue of priorities moot Un-
less an appeul may be taken at this point, 
pendency of the appeal (see Footnote 1) should 
make with respect to plaintiffs bid 
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law with respect to the execution of proc-
ess, and if for any reason such process is 
improperly executed, then and in such 
case to vacate the improper proceeding 
had pursuant to the process, and order 
the issuance of another in lieu thereof 
The court below was in error in holding 
that it was without jurisdiction to hear 
and determine the motion to vacate the* 
order of sale 
Bland Bros also points out a defect in the 
publication of notice of the sheriffs sale, 
namely that there was no publication in a 
Davis County newspaper in the week imme-
diately preceding the sale as required by 
Rule 69(eXl), (3), U R C P Since this issue 
should be considered by the trial court in 
connection with the determination as to the 
validity of the sheriffs sale, we decline to 
deal with it here 
Our decision regarding the priority issue 
makes it unnecessary to rule on additional 
matters argued by the parties herein It is 
the opinion of this Court that the lower 
court was correct in granting priority to the 
mechanics' hen claimants inasmuch as the 
initial work by Child Bros established the 
priority date for all who provided labor and 
services on the Lakeview Terrace subdivi-
sion The action of the trial court as to the 
setting of priorities is therefore affirmed aa 
it pertains, to the hen claimants who remain 
as parties to this appeal 
We affirm the trial court's determination 
that the mechanics' and materialmen's hens 
of the defendants whose appeal his not 
been dismissed have priority over FDMI's 
trust deed We remand for any necessary 
consideration of the issues raised with re-
spect to the sheriff's sale 
Costs to defendants 
CROCKCIT, C J , and MAUGHAN, 
WILKINS and HALL, JJ , concur 
substantial property interests may be de-
stroyed since the sheriff's sale would pro-
ceed and the money would be disbursed on 
the basis of the priorities determined by the 
trial court With the issuance of a sheriffs 
deed and the disbursement of monies, the 
legal rights and obligations of the parties 
are finally established Accordingly, under 
a pragmatic view of the test of finality, the 
order appealed in this case is final 
Consolidated with the appeal of FDMI 
and Citibank in Case No 15696 is an appeal 
by Bland Bros , Case No 16051, which chal-
lenges the refusal of the trial court to set 
aside the sheriffs sale held pursuant to the 
foreclosure order The facts pertaining to 
this appeal may be set out briefly The 
Lakeview Terrace property was offered at 
a sheriff's sale on January 19, 1978 FDMI, 
pursuant to its agreement, bid the sum (as 
amended) of $1,944 732 86, and subsequently 
received the sheriff's dtt.d to the property 
Before the deed was issued, and when the 
normal six-month redemption period was 
about to expire, Bland Bros moved the 
lower court to vacate the sale because plain-
tiff FDMI had failed to pay the amount of 
its bid into the court as had been ordered 
The trial court in an order dated August 15, 
1978, denied the motion, stating that its 
jurisdiction was lost when the appeal re-
garding lien priorities was taken to the 
Supreme Court The court on its own mo-
tion ordered FDMI to post a supersedeas 
bond in the amount of the claims of the 
mechanics' henholders who had been ad-
judged to have first priority 
[12] Blind Bros argues that the lower 
court retained jurisdiction over the enforce-
ment of its decree inasmuch as no superse-
deas bond was posted prior to the sheriff's 
sale or before Bland Bros' motion to have 
the safe VAtdttd This position is correct 
and is sustained by this Court's opinion in 
Skeen v I t H7 Utah 121, at 125, 48 P 2d 
457, at 458 (19J5), which statid 
As an incident to the authority remaining 
in the trial court to enforce a decree of 
foreclosure, where an appeal is had with-
out a supersedeas bond or stay, is the 
authority to compel compliance with the 
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WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORA-
TION, a corporation, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
COTTONWOOD CONSTRUCTION COMPA-
NY, a corporation et ah, Defendants, 
Oscar E. Chytraus Company, Inc., a corpora-
tion, Gibbons & Reed Concrete Products 
Company, a corporation, Richard P. Gar-
rlck, Boise Cascade Corporation, a corpora-
tion, Defendants and Appellants. i 
No. 10516. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 27, 10G7. 
Action involving priorities of construc-
tion mortgage and mechanics' liens. The 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County, 
Aldon J. Anderson, J., made findings as to 
relative priorities of mechanics' lienors and 
mortcigcc, and the lienors took an inter-
locutory appeal. The Supreme Court, Tuck-
ctt, J., held that construction money mort-
gage providing that mortgage will also 
secure additional loans made by the then 
holder of the note secured to the then owner 
of the real estate described, provided that 
no such additional loan would be made if 
the making thereof would cause the total 
indebtedness secured to exceed the amount 
of the original indebtedness, created obli-
gation on part of lender to pay over funds 
in accordance with borrower's directions 
and mortgagee had priority for monies ac-
tually advanced under mortgages over liens 
for materials furnished subsequent to re-
cording of mortgages. 
Affirmed. 
Ilcnriod, J., dissented in part. 
I. Mortgages C=>151(3) 
Construction money mortgage provid-
ing that mortgage would secure additional 
loans made by the then holder of the note 
secured to the then owner of the real estate 
described but providing that no such addi-
thcrcof would cause the total indebtedness 
secured to exceed the amount of the orig-
inal indebtedness, created obligation on part 
of lender to pay over funds in accordance 
with borrower's directions, and mortgagee 
thus had priority for monies actually ad-
vanced under mortgage over liens for ma-
terials furnished subsequent to recording 
of mortgage. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5. 
2. Mechanics' Lions C=»I73 
Statute providing for mechanics' Hen 
upon "commencement to do work or fur-
nish materials on the ground" is limited to 
the home or other structure which is being 
or about to be built upon the land, and liens 
for labor or materials furnished inj off-site 
improvements in connection with laying out 
and construction of facilities used in con-
nection with subdivision as a whole would 
not relate back and take effect as of time 
first work was done in respect to laying out 
the subdivision and the installation of water 
lines, sewers, curbs and gutters and street 
paving. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5. ^ 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Mechanics' Liens <3=*183 
Presence of materials on building site 
or evidence on the ground that work has 
commenced on " structure or preparatory 
thereto is notice to all the world that liens 
may have attached, however, off-site con-
struction in developing subdivision for build-
ing sites would not necessarily bring to at-
tention of lendor that someone might be 
claiming lien to particular lot, especially 
where lendor advances construction money 
to build home long after subdivision has 
been developed. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5. 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 
Fabian & Clcndcnin, Cannon, Duffin & 
Pace, Maik & Schoenhals, Neslcn & Mock, 
Salt Lake City, for appellants. 
Ilalliday & Ilalliday, Backman, Back-
man & Clark, Ray Quinncy & Nebckcr, 
Salt Lake City, for respondent 
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^ CKXTT, Just ice 
uis case is now before the court on an 
ocutory appeal I t involves the rela-
/«* priorities of mechanics lienors' and a 
oi - truction mor tgage which the plaintiff 
rd respondent seeks to foreclose on lot 10, 
u,i«./ Bar Subdivision of Salt Lake County 
T h e district court made certain rulings 
sf which the following two arc the subject 
Df this appeal 
1 T h a t the documents evidencing the 
mortgage transaction between the plaintiff-
respondent, Wes te rn Mor tgage Loan Cor-
poi ition and the defendant, Cottonwood 
instruction Company, provided for oblig-
«. Q-/ or nonvohtional advances, and that 
si c I adv anccs together with at torneys fees 
r id costs take priori ty as of the time of the 
r e^r j ing of the mortgage 
2 A denial of the mechanics lienors* 
r^ot on for a part ial summary judgment to 
trie effect that certain work constituted the 
' commencement to do work or furnish ma-
terials on the ground for the structure or 
improvement" within the meaning of Sec-
tion 38-1-5, U C A 1 9 5 3 
T i u work of laying out and developing 
n e subdivision, including engineering, in 
st tl ig water mains, sewer mains and later 
aii>, curb and gut ter , surfacing streets and 
other off site construction was accom-
phsl cd by Cottonwood Construction Com 
nany ( the mor tgagor) and its predecessors 
I n e l i t e ra l sewer line installed on l o t 10 
terminated inside the lot T h e sewer and 
iteral were completed about January 1, 
1961 W a t e r mams were completed about 
August , 1962, streets, curb and gutter were 
commenced in 1961 and completed in 1962 
1 he Mountain States Telephone and 1 ele 
gr iph Company erceted utility poles m the 
subdivision, including one on Lot 10 
Application for a construction lo m w is 
m ide to Western Mor tgage Loan Coipora 
tion and appro\ cd A note and mortg igc in 
the amount of $1S,750 00 were executed 
I ITt il» S miiAjs & T (urn \*»vo<nhon v 
Mich mi, 12 Utnh Jil J3T, oOO 1'IW 5«W 
October 29, 1962, and the moi tgage was re-
corded that day 
A separate loan agreement* was entered 
into between Western and Cottonwood Con-
struction Company, which piovtded in part 
tha t in event of default on the par t of the 
mortgagor , Western was released from all 
fur ther obligations to the borrower, or in 
the al ternative, it could take possession of 
the premises, finish the impro\ emai l s and 
charge the costs to the borrower to. be 
secured on the note and mortgage 
W h e n it later became apparent th it 
Cottonwood h i d misapphtd fundi ad\anced 
by Wes te rn , the l i t t e r elected to complete 
the home At the time Western took over 
the construction it had advanced approxi-
mately $9,500 An additional sum of about 
$5,000 was used to complete the home on 
Lot 10 
[1] A provision of the note and mort 
gage is as follows "This mortgage shall 
also secure addition il loans hereafter made 
by the then holder of the note secured here-
by to the then owner of the real estate 
described herein, provided that no such ad 
chtional loan shall be made if the m i k n g 
thereof would cause the tot il indebtedness 
secured hereby to exceed the imount of the 
original indebtedness stated herein " 
I t is the appellants' contention that the 
language of the note and mortgage 
quoted above provided for nonvohtional or 
nonobhgatory ad\ mces and that each ad 
vance made thereunder takes priority only 
as of its date 
Under the construction loan agreement 
Wes te rn was obhgi ted to p i> out the funds 
as the building progressed W e are ot the 
opinion that the agreement to disburse the 
funds created <\n obligation on the part of 
lender to pay over the funds m aecord 
ance with the borrower 's d i r ec t ions 1 \Vc 
see no distinction between the mortgage in 
Ut ih S iv nigs «1 l o a n Association v Me 
ch im 2 and the mortgage before us in this. 
2 Ibi.l .^ nlky I umber Co v \ \ ri^ht 2 
t_ il App 2S8, 84 P 5i>, Home Snings 
WXi»?£XJ4.VXl .tr-tv*'.* «•«.-«.—- . 
case Under the terms of the loan agree 
ment Western was obligated to deposit the 
net proceeds of the loan in a separate ac-
count to be expended in accoi dance with the 
agreement T h e mortgage provides for ad-
ditional loans to be secured by the mortgage, 
nevertheless, the instrument is for a single 
fixed amount, and no additional loans were 
in fact made 
T h e appellants' second assignment of 
e r ror relates to the court 's denial of the mo-
tion for summary judgment based upon a 
finding that the facts set forth in the sup-
porting affidavits did not constitute "com-
mencement to do work or furnish materials 
on the ground for the structure or improve-
ment" within the meaning of Section 38—1— 
5 U C A 1953 T h e appellants claim they 
a re entitled to have their hens relate back 
and take effect as of the time the first 
work was done in respect to laving out the 
subdivision and the installation of water-* 
lines, sewers, curb and gutters and street 
paving 
Cite as 424 P 2d 437 
V 
[2 3] W e arc not inclined to give tin? 
s tatute such a broad meaning as contended 
for by the appellants W e are inclined to' 
the view that the legislature intended the j 
language commencement to do work or 
furnish materials on the ground" to be hm 
ited to relate to the home or other structure 
which was being or about to be built upon 
the land T o tack the hens for labor or ma-
terials that went into the construction of the, 
house to the hens that may have arisen for 
labor and ma ten lis furnished in off site im-
provements in connection with the laying 
out di\d construction of faciht es used in 
connection with the subdivision as a whole 
would be going beyond the intent of the 
s tatute T h e problem is one of notice The 
presence of materials on the building site 
or evidence on the ground that work has 
commenced on a structure or preparatory 
M/ 
& T o in Asso ntion v Burton, 20 Wash 
(»NS ,r>(> P OiO s<o ilso mno i(5 A I It 
3 102 SO M K2d 101 57 C I S Me 
choniis T icns § 20T> p 774 
thereto is notice to all the world that hensT 
may have at tached. However , the off-| 
site construct ion in developing the sub j 
division for building sites would not neces I 
s an ly br ing to the attention of a lender \ 
that someone is claiming a lien on a pa r t i a l - l 
lar lot in the subdivision This is especially j 
t rue as in this case, where the lender ad-
v anccd money to build a home long after the 
subdivision had been laid out and developed 
It is apparent that the persons who supplied 
labor or materials for the construction of 
roads, sewers, e t c , could have filed hens 
for imp nd balances due them, if any. The 
erection of the home was separate and scv 
erable from the earlier work in developing 
Ithe subdivision 3 ^ / 
T h e orders and rulings of the district 
court a rc aff irmed. Costs to respondent 
C A I L I S 1 E R and T L L L T , J J , concur 
C R O C K E T T , Chief Justice (concurr ing 
specially) . 
I ag ree that under the facts as disclosed 
in this case a mortgage for a definite 
amount, which is recorded prior to the at 
tachment of any hen rights, should under 
normal circumstances take preference up to 
the amount that is paid out under the terms 
of the recorded mortgage agreement But 
I desire to note that there may be situations 
in which the lending institution is holding 
monev not yet advanced on a building, when 
it acquncs actual knowledge that the builder 
is diver t ing money to some other purpose, 
and knows that the laborers or materialmen 
a re not being paid and will not be paid 
Under such circumstances the financier ccr 
tainly should not be permitted to go on pay-
ing the money to a builder and thus in effect 
assist in cheat ing the laborers and material-
men out of their pay and preclude them 
\ ilion tl T timber Co v F i rmrr & ^on, 
ln« i t nl 2">t Mum 100 S7 N >\ 2d 32 
ltupp v 1 ail II C lino & Son* lue et 
il 2 50 Mil 573, 183 A 2.1 1 10, 1 A L K 
Jd 815 
4 4 0 U tah 421 P A C I F I C R E P 
from the right to Hen protection. Sec dis-
senting opinion of Jones, District Judge, in 
Utah Savings & Loan Association v. Me-
cham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P 2d 598. 
H E N R I O D , Just ice (concurring and dis-
senting) : 
I concur in that portion of the main opin-
ion with respect to commencement of work, 
etc., but dissent from that portion having to 
do with priori ty of liens of materialmen. 
T h e main opinion says, " W e sec no dis-
tinction between the mortgage in Utah Sav-
ings & Loan Association v. Median ." This 
statement is disarming. True , there is no 
difference in the recorded mortgage, upon 
which Utah Savings relied, and the one 
here . T h e fallacy of the main opinion's 
conclusion lies in its assumption that the 
cjuse of action in the Utah Savings case 
was identical to this present Western Mor t -
gage case. T h e former was based on the 
recorded mortgage, while in this case it was 
based on an unrecorded collate} at agree-
ment snuggled to the bosoms of the mort-
gagor and mortgagee, without any oppor-
tunity for the materialmen to take a look-
see. 
T h e cases are not the same. In U t a h 
Savings, materialmen could rely on the rec-
ord. In our present case the main opinion 
charges mater ialmen with notice of an un-
recorded, independent agreement. T h e 
recorded mor tgage in Utah Savings said ad-
vancement of moneys by the mor tg igee was 
obligatory. T h e unrecorded collateral 
agreement in the present case clearly was 
not obligatory, but volitional. A mater ia l-
man may not deliver a two-by-four piece of 
plywood if he knew he could not rely on the 
recorded promise of the mortgagee to pay 
the mortgagor as represented, but would be 
bound by a secret, unrecorded agreement 
that would permit the mortgngec to cancel 
the recorded promise five minutes after it 
was recorded, an incident beyond the ken of 
a mater ialman. T o conclude otherwise does 
not dignify the recording act. 
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